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1Abstract
In this paper we analyze the impact of hedging activities of large Canadian oil
and gas companies on their stock return and rm value. Diering from the existing
literature this research pays particular attention to possible nonlinear payos of
hedging activities, which may not be fully revealed in the traditional linear frame-
work. By using generalized additive models, we nd that the factors that aect
stock return and rm value are indeed nonlinear. The large Canadian oil and gas
rms are able to hedge against downside risk induced by unfavorable oil and gas
price changes. But gas hedging appears to be more eective than oil hedging when
downside risk presents. In addition, oil reserves tend to have a positive (negative)
impact on stock returns when the oil prices are increasing (decreasing). Finally,
hedging, in particular hedging for gas, together with protability, leverage and
reserves, has a signicant impact on rm value.
Keywords: hedging, risk management, oil and gas, equity returns, Tobin's Q ratio,
generalized additive model, semi-parametric model, nonlinearity
JEL classication: G100, C100
21 Introduction
According to the Modigliani-Miller theorem, in a perfect nancial market, hedging would
add no value to the rm when there is no asymmetric information, taxes, or transaction
costs. However, in the real world, this conclusion may not hold because the assumptions
on which the theorem is based are generally violated.
Maximizing shareholder value is one of the aims of the corporate management. Gen-
erally, maximizing shareholder value means maintaining and increasing the cash ow of
the corporation over time. Hedging can be an eective tool for dealing with the impact
of unexpected events on shareholder value. Hedging activities take various forms in-
cluding managing price risk, protecting mortgage portfolios from interest rate volatility,
preventing erosion in the value of cash reserves, deriving better returns on short-term
investments, locking in a future interest rate, enhancing the yield of an investment port-
folio, designing an eective foreign currency swap program and so on. Theoretically,
hedging prevent shareholders from incurring unexpected losses but also decrease the
potential for gains. When hedging is implemented properly, it may protect stock return
and increase rm value.
But does hedging actually aect rm value? The literature has not yet reached a
consensus and evidence is somewhat mixed. Some empirical studies support the hy-
pothesis but some do not. The literature on the eectiveness of hedging has focused
primarily on the hedging activities in the nancial and commodity risk management.
The former includes currency and interest rate hedging. Jorion (1990) illustrates that
the foreign currency beta of the U.S. multinational companies is close to zero, meaning
hedging on foreign currency does not inuence rm value at all. Gagnon et al. (1998)
employ constructed currency portfolios to show that dynamic hedging strategies can in-
deed reduce risk. Allayannis and Weston (2001) use a linear model for the U.S. data and
nd that hedging enhances rm value. Bartram et al. (2003) examine a large sample
3of multi-industry companies and nd that interest rate hedging, not currency hedging,
has a positive impact on rm value. Commodity hedging includes hedging activities on
grain, jet fuel, oil and gas, and precious metal such as gold. Sephton (1993) shows that
the commodity hedge ratio can be best estimated with the GARCH models. Tufano
(1996) studies the hedging activities of North American gold mining rms and nds
little evidence to support risk management as a means of maximizing shareholder value.
On the other hand, Carter et al. (2003) investigate hedging for jet fuel by rms in the
U.S. airline industry and nd that jet fuel hedging increases rm value of the airline
industry. But in the most recent study of the U.S. oil and gas companies Jin and Jorion
(2005) nd that hedging oil and gas prices has little impact on rm value.
Although empirical studies have evaluated the impact of hedging activities on rm
value, no study has ever examined the role of hedging in Canadian oil and gas com-
panies.1 Canada is recognized as the 3rd largest producer of natural gas and the 9th
largest producer of crude oil in the world. Canada has signicant, untapped natural gas
reserves, with the largest growth areas expected in the North and on the East Coast.2
Canada also has huge tar sand reserves, second to the petroleum reserves of Saudi Ara-
bia. Because of Canada's geography, more than 80% of the oil and gas production is
exported to the U.S.3 For Canadian oil and gas producers, oil and gas prices, foreign
exchange rates, and interest rates can generate nancial and operational uncertainties.
It is known that some large Canadian oil and gas companies have been using hedging
to reduce the impact of oil and gas price volatility. But there is no systematic study,
neither is there any empirical evidence, on the roles that hedging activities have played
in the Canadian oil and gas industries.
1Haushalter (2000) has studied the reasons for using hedging in the U.S. oil and gas companies while
Jin and Jorion (2005) have studied the impact of hedging activities in the U.S. oil and gas companies
on rm value.
2The data is from Natural Resource Canada (NRC) 2003 annual reports.
3The data is 2003 annual reports of Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP).
4The purpose of this paper is therefore to examine the impact of hedging activities
on stock returns and rm value of large Canadian oil and gas companies and to add
new evidence on the roles of hedging activities. As pointed out by Jin and Jorion
(2005), studying oil and gas industries for hedging has a number of advantages. First,
the volatility of oil and gas prices can inuence the cash ow of oil and gas companies
directly and immediately. Second, the homogeneity of the oil and gas industries renders
the study of hedging eects on Tobin's Q ratio based on the oil and gas industries more
appropriate than those multi-industry studies where other signicant factors may come
into play. Third, because oil and gas reserves are main parts of the value of oil and gas
companies, hedging may potentially inuence protability and rm value.
This study uses a unique data set manually collected from large Canadian oil and
gas companies during the period of 2000-2002. In this period, the oil and gas prices
were volatile. The data collection procedure used here follows the method of Allayannis
and Weston (2001), Carter et al. (2003) and Jin and Jorion (2005). It also considers
the unique situations in Canada. In the existing study using the U.S. data, hedging
data were typically collected from Item 7A \Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures
about Market Risk" in the 10-K annual reports for the U.S. companies. However, the
10-K reports are not generally available for most Canadian oil and gas companies. Only
Imperial Oil and Nexen have led the 10-K reports but there is no hedge information
available in Item 7A for Imperial Oil and no Item 7A for Nexen at all. This research
therefore collects the hedging data on futures, options, and swap contracts as well as
xed-price physical delivery contracts and volumetric production payments directly from
the annual reports of these companies. This method is more precise than just employing
notional amount of derivatives or hedging dummy variables. The accounting data, such
as market value and dividend, are retrieved from the Datastream database.4 After
extensive search, thirty-three companies that have hedging and reserves data during
4Datasteam is a comprehensive database for global investment research, providing historical interna-
tional data on broad economic and nancial matters, including company accounts, economic indicators,
equity, bonds, futures and options, commodities and interest rates, made by Thomson Financial.
5the period are identied, resulting the annual data of eighty-eight rm-years. Among
them, twenty-eight companies and seventy-six rm-years are identied with the complete
hedging, reserves and accounting data. In order to evaluate the impact of the hedging
on stock returns, we augment the data by incorporating month stock returns, resulting
the monthly data of eight hundred and eighty-one rm-months. To our knowledge, this
is perhaps the most comprehensive data for large Canadian oil and gas companies at
this time.
The statistical analysis of the data in this paper shows that relationships between
hedging activities and payos (stock returns and rm value) are generally nonlinear.
The linear models traditionally employed in the existing research literature may be too
restricted for identifying nonlinear eects. They can be biased and misleading if the
true relationships are nonlinear. Therefore, this research proposes the use of the exible
generalized additive models (GAM) [see Hestie (1990), Hestie and Tibshirani (1990),
Wood (2000), Venables and Ripley (2002), and Wood (2004)], which is semi-parametric
in nature. As shown later in the paper, GAM is statistically superior to the linear model
because GAM can accommodate both linear and nonlinear relationships without being
restricted to the former.
By using the unique data and GAMs, this research presents new empirical evidence
on the roles of hedging activities in the Canadian oil and gas sector. This research nds
that the large Canadian oil and gas rms are able to use hedging to protect downside
risk against unfavorable oil and gas price changes. But gas hedging appears to be more
eective than oil hedging when downside risk presents. In addition, oil reserves tend
to have a positive (negative) impact on stock returns when the oil prices are increasing
(decreasing). Finally, hedging, in particular gas hedging, together with protability,
leverage and reserves, has a signicant impact on rm value.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3 explains the data collection and sample information. Section 4
6reports the ndings about the impact of hedging activities on the relationship between
oil and gas prices and stock returns. Section 5 discusses the ndings of the impact of
hedging on rm value. Finally, Section 6 oers concluding remarks.
2 Hedging Literature
2.1 Roles of Hedging
When the nancial market is imperfect, hedging activities of a rm can directly aect the
volatility of cash ow. When oil/gas price falls, the oil/gas producer will lose revenue if it
does not use xed-price contracts or options to hedge against the risk of price volatility.
When the income of a rm surges, tax liability of the rm will increase the context of
a convex tax schedule.5 In this case, hedging can help the rm to smooth its cash ow
and to avoid the volatility of the cash ow exacerbated by the tax regime.
In the theoretical literature on hedging, three main motivations for hedging are dis-
cussed. First, hedging is used to reduce nancial distress and avoid underinvestment.
Second, it is used to reduce expected tax costs. Third, hedging can alleviate the man-
ager's personal risk exposure. These are reviewed as follows.
2.1.1 Financial Distress and Underinvestment
When high volatility of cash ow is expected to cause a mismatch between the avail-
able liquidity and xed payment obligations, managers need to consider and implement
hedging. Smith and Stulz (1985) analyze the impact of hedging on expected bankruptcy
costs and nd that hedging can reduce the likelihood of nancial distress of the rm,
lower its expected bankruptcy costs, and therefore increase its debt capacity and rm
5This refers to the schedule where the eective tax rate is greater as the taxable income gets higher.
7value. Mayer and Smith (1990) also nd that the rm, by reducing cash ow volatility
via hedging, can eectively reduce bankruptcy costs, minimize the loss of tax shields,
and secure valuable growth options.
From the theoretical perspective, Stulz (1990) and Froot et al. (1993) note that
hedging can help companies to maintain adequate internal funds available for good
investment opportunities and thus avoid underinvestment. Without risk management,
rms sometimes are forced to pursue suboptimal investment opportunities because low
cash ow can prevent rms from pursuing optimal investment opportunities or obtaining
low-cost nancing. Therefore, everything else being equal, the more diculties rms
face in obtaining external nancing, the less sucient cash ow there will be, and the
higher hedge premium these rms will pay. By analyzing cash ow in a two-period
investment/nancing decision model, Froot et al. (1993) nd that rms with costly
external nanced projects would be better o utilizing risk management to reduce the
inuence of external nancing on these projects.
Allayannis and Mozumdar (2000) conduct an empirical study of the S&P 500 non-
nancial rms and nd that rms signicantly exposed to the foreign exchange rate
risk can use foreign currency derivatives to reduce their dependence on external cash
ow for investment. Adam (2002) examines the roles of hedging in 111 North American
gold mining companies and nds a positive relationship between the minimum revenue
guaranteed by hedging and investment expenditures. The empirical evidence suggests
that hedging can increase the likelihood of internal nancing for investment and reduce
its dependence on external nancing.
2.1.2 Expected Tax Costs
Smith and Stulz (1985) discuss the tax-induced explanation for risk management. In
the presence of a convex tax schedule, the rm can employ risk management to reduce
the volatility of taxable income that would otherwise be exacerbated by the expected
8tax liabilities. The rm tends to hedge when it has high leverage, shorter debt maturity,
lower interest coverage, less liquidity, and high dividend yields because it prefers stable
cash ow. Therefore reducing the volatility of taxable income generates greater rm
value if the rm faces a convex tax function. Graham and Smith (1999) empirically
analyze more than 80,000 COMPUSTAT rm-year cases based on three measures for
eective tax functions.6 They nd that, in approximately 50% of the cases, convex tax
schedules lead to tax-based incentives to hedge. Graham and Rogers (2002) use the data
of 3,232 U.S. companies and an explicit measure for the convex tax schedule and nd
that hedging does not reduce tax liability when facing a convex tax schedule. However,
they suggest that these rms may smooth incomes by other means.
2.1.3 Managerial Risk
According to Stulz (1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985), risk averse managers tend to
use hedging if they have a direct interest in the business earnings and if it is costly to
hedge for their own accounts. Smith and Stulz (1985) note that managers holding more
stocks of their own rms would emphasize risk management more than those holding
more options do. This is because stocks provide linear payos to the managers whereas
options provide convex payos. Further, the convexity of option payos may provide
an incentive for the managers who hold more options to bear more risk. In addition,
DeMarzo and Due (1995) point out that hedging may serve as a signal of managerial
ability to external investors. Among a few empirical studies, Tufano (1996) examines
the hedging activities of forty-eight North American gold mining companies and nds
that rms whose managers hold more options use less risk management and rms whose
managers holding more stocks use more risk management. This nding is consistent with
the prediction of Smith and Stulz (1985). The empirical studies that support DeMarzo
6The three variables are tax loss carry forwards, investment tax credit, and a binary variable that
indicates whether the rm is in the convex region of the tax code based on the rm's historical pretax
income.
9and Due (1995) include the work of Whidbee and Wohar (1999), which studies the
information of 175 publicly traded bank holding companies and nd that the managerial
incentives and external monitoring aect the decision to use derivatives. In addition,
Dionne and Triki (2005) nd that independence and nancial knowledge of the directors
of the board would aect hedging decisions based on the data of the thirty-six North
American gold mining rms.
2.2 Impact of Hedging on Firm Value
In the existing literature, Rajgopal (1999) analyzes the informational role of the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC)'s market risk disclosures of thirty-eight U.S. oil
and gas companies. He nds that oil and gas reserves have a positive impact on the
relationship between stock returns and oil and gas prices. Jin and Jorion (2005) extend
the work of Rajgopal (1999) by adding hedging variables and nd that hedging can
weaken the relationship between stock returns and oil and gas prices while oil and gas
reserves can strengthen the relationship.
Allayannis and Weston (2001) directly examine the relationship between foreign cur-
rency hedging and rm value measured by Tobin's Q ratio, based on a sample of 720
American non-nancial rms with total asset more than USD$500 million. By adding
some control variables such as protability and leverage into the regression model, they
nd that hedging is positively related to rm value and that rms with hedging have,
on average, 4.87% higher rm value than those without. Geczy et al. (1997) analyze
foreign currency derivatives of Fortune 500 companies and nd that hedging for foreign
currency risk is more dicult to evaluate in multinational companies because the net
impact of hedging can be distorted by many other factors such as foreign sales, foreign-
denominated debts, foreign taxes, etc. Using the framework of Allayannis and Weston
(2001), Carter et al. (2003) examine the impact of jet fuel hedging on rm value based
on the sample of twenty-seven American airline companies. They nd that jet fuel hedg-
10ing is positively related to airline rm value. The coecients on the hedging variables
in their regression suggest that the hedging premium contributes approximately a 12-16
percent increase in rm value. Jin and Jorion (2005) examine the hedging activities of
119 American oil and gas companies to evaluate the impact of oil and gas hedging on
rm value. But they nd no evidence to support the view that hedging aects rm
value.
It is noted that the existing literature primarily focuses on linear models of hedging
and rm value using the American data and that there is only one major study on
the U.S. oil and gas industry. This paper attempts to contribute to the literature by
studying hedging and rm value for Canadian oil and gas companies based on more
exible semi-parametric nonlinear models.
3 Data and Sample Description
3.1 Sample Description
There are several issues that one must face in the data selection from the universe
of the Canadian oil/gas exploration and production companies. First, the Canadian
economy has a strong resource and mining sector with many oil and gas exploration and
production rms. Many of them, however, are small exploration rms and generally
not involved in hedging activities.7 Hence we need to select relatively large and mature
oil and gas exploration and production rms which are involved in hedging activities.
Second, some of the large oil and gas companies with hedging activities are integrated
oil and gas companies. That is, they are not only involved in the oil and gas exploration
but also engaging in renery and marketing. In order to evaluate the role of hedging
activities, it is essential to include these companies. Ignoring them would cause the
7The detailed analysis is given below.
11loss of valuable information and lead to a rather small sample which is unlikely to give
us an accurate picture. Third, some substantial oil and gas players in Canada are
partly owned by international corporations and partly owned by investors in Canada
(for example, Imperial Oil is partly owned by ExxonMobil in the US, Husky Energy is
partly owned by Hutchison Whampoa in Hong Kong, China, and Shell Canada is partly
owned by the Royal Dutch Shell in Holland). These oil and gas rms also constitute a
large share of the Canadian oil and gas industries and should be duly included. Fourth,
Canadian economy is about one-tenth of the size of the US economy. Compare to the
similar studies for the US oil and gas industries, the Canadian sample size would be
considerably smaller. Therefore, we should use as much as the relevant information as
we can while bearing in mind the limited scope of the Canadian oil and gas industries.
In order to nd a largest relevant sample of oil and gas companies in Canada, we have
selected oil and gas companies with market value more than Cdn$500 million in 2004.8
Thirty-eight oil/gas exploration and production companies (for example, EnCana, Cana-
dian Natural Resources, Talisman Energy, and Nexen) and eight oil integrated companies
(for example, Suncor Energy, Petro-Canada, Imperial Oil, and Husky Energy) meet the
criterion. Thirty-three of oil and gas companies of the above list have led reports with
the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) during the period
of 2000-2002. Thus, we have eighty-eight rm year data, of which seventy-one rm-year
data (about 80.7%) are for oil nad gas exploration and production companies and sev-
enteen rm year data (about 19.3%) are for integrated oil companies. The largest ve
companies in the sample are Encana,9 Imperial Oil., Shell Canada, Suncor Energy, and
Petro-Canada, whose average market value is Cdn$23.8 billion in 2004. The smallest ve
rms are Gastar Exploration, Crescent Point Energy, Nuvista Energy, Ketch Resource,
and Pan-Ocean Energy, whose average market value is about Cdn$522 million in 2004.
8The hedging activities and records of these oil and gas rms are more likely to be available and
documented systematically. SEDAR is developed in Canada for the Canadian Securities Administrators
(CSA).The annual reports from SEDAR are available in www.sedar.com.
9Encana was established from merging Alberta Energy Company Ltd. and PanCanadian Energy
Corporation in 2001.
12Because we are interested in the hedging information of the selected rms, we use the
nancial market and accounting data of these rms for the period of 2000-2002.
When we analyze the impact of hedging on the relationship between oil and gas
prices and stock returns, we use the monthly oil and gas prices from the New York
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and monthly stock returns of these oil and gas rms
from Datastream. The monthly data are then combined with the annual accounting and
hedging data, which are discussed in the following part of this paper.
3.2 Hedging Information
All the hedging information of the sample is from the annual reports of selected com-
panies led at SEDAR or posted at the companies' websites. The existing research
such as Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Jin and Jorion (2005) collect the hedging
information primarily from the 10-K annual reports. In 1997, the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) declared Financial Reporting Release No.48 (FRR 48),
which require disclosure for market risk for all rms for the scal year ending after June
15th, 1998.10 However, there is no such regulation for Canadian companies at the time
of this research. Hedging information may be found directly in two parts of an annual re-
port: (a) Risk Management of Management's Discussion and Analysis and (b) Financial
Instruments in Notes of Consolidated Financial Statement (see Appendix 1 for an exam-
ple). In general, the information in Management's Discussion and Analysis highlights
the hedging activities in the scal year. The information in Financial Instruments in
Notes of Consolidated Financial Statement details hedging contracts such as outstanding
hedging contract at the end of the scal year. The main hedging instruments used by
10Under this regulation, U.S. rms are required to report in their annual reports quantitative infor-
mation on exposures of contract amounts and weighted average spot prices for forwards and futures;
weighted average pay and receive rates and/or prices for swaps; contract amounts and weighted average
strike prices for options.
13Table 1: Delta and Hedging Instruments
Delta Hedging Instrument
-1 short linear contracts, including short futures and forwards,
xed-priced contracts, xed-received swaps
and volumetric production arrangements
value from non-linear contracts, including options,
Black-Scholes collars and three-way options
option models
Note: The value of each contract is mark to the market.
Canadian oil and gas companies are xed-price contracts, forwards, received-xed swaps
and options (including collars and three-way options) (see Appendix 2 for details).
Following the method proposed by Jin and Jorion (2005), we calculate individual
deltas and sum them up for each rm for each scal year. This sum is a measure for the
degree of hedging in each rm for that year. This method of calculating each delta is
detailed in Table 1. The total delta value of crude oil and natural gas hedging for each
rm-year is the sum of the products of deltas and their corresponding notional dollar
values of all hedging contracts [The notional output measure of crude oil is expressed in
barrel (bbl) and that of natural gas contracts is presented in million of British thermal
unit (mmbtu)].
The total delta value is then scaled by the annual production or the commodity
reserves, named adjusted delta, such as the adjusted delta of oil production and that of
oil reserves. In this study the value of delta is zero or negative and we multiply negative
one to the value to reect the positive role of the adjusted total deltas in the stock return
and rm value.
We use gas production and gas reserves as an example to show how the adjusted
deltas are dened:
14Adjusted delta of gas production (Dgp) =  
 
Total delta value of gas hedging
V alue of next year gas production
!
Adjusted delta of gas reserves (Dgr) =  
 
Total delta value of gas hedging
V alue of same year gas reserve
!
That is, the adjusted delta of production, Dgp, represents the percentage of next
year production that is eectively hedged, while the adjusted delta of reserves, Dgr,
gives the proportion of current reserves that is eectively hedged. We use Dop and Dor
to denote the adjusted deltas of oil production and oil reserves, respectively.
Table 2 shows the hedging and non-hedging information of the rm-years in the
sample. There are 25 non-hedging (in both oil and gas) rm-years (about 28.4% of
the sample), 56 rm-years hedging oil prices exposure (about 63.7% of the sample), 50
rm-years hedging gas prices exposure (56.8% of the sample), and 43 rm-year hedging
both oil and gas prices exposure (about 48.9% of the sample).
Table 3 illustrates the basic statistics of the adjusted deltas. In terms of the number
of the rms that hedge, Canadian oil and gas companies hedge less relative to the oil
and gas reserves than the U.S. oil and gas companies do. The average Dop, Dgp, Dor
and Dgr of the U.S. oil and gas companies are 33%, 41%, 4% and 5% respectively,
while those of Canadian oil and gas companies in this study are 14.6%, 8.1%, 1.8% and
1.3%, respectively.11 These numbers show that the U.S. companies are more likely to
employ risk management than their Canadian counterparts are. However, the standard
deviations of Dop and Dgp for the U.S. data are 33% and 40% respectively, higher
than those of the Canadian sample | 20.4% and 14.8%.12 This suggests that the
11See Jin and Jorion (2005) for the U.S. numbers.
12See Jin and Jorion (2005) for the U.S. numbers.
15Table 2: Description of Firm-years: Hedging and Non-hedging
Gas: Gas: Total
Hedging Non-Hedging
Firm-year Count (%) Firm-year Count (%) Firm-year Count (%)
Oil: Hedging 43 (48.9) 13 (14.8) 56 (63.7)
Firm-year Count(%)
Oil: Non-Hedging 7 (8.0) 25 (28.4) 32 (36.3)
Firm-year Count(%)
Total 50 (56.8) 38 (43.2) 88 (100)
Firm-year Count(%)
Table 3: Basic Statistics of Adjusted Deltas
Adjust Delta Mean Standard Deviation No. of Firm-years
Oil Production (Dop) 14.6% 20.4% 88
Gas Production (Dgp) 8.1% 14.8% 88
Oil Reserves (Dor) 1.8% 2.6% 88
Gas Reserves (Dgr) 1.3% 2.9% 88
Production Average 11.4%
Reserves Average 1.6%
large Canadian oil and gas companies are more homogeneous in hedging than their U.S.
counterparts.
3.3 Tobin's Q Ratio
Tobin suggested that the combined market value of all the companies on the stock
market should be equal to their replacement costs [Tobin (1969) and Hayashi (1982)].
The Q ratio is theoretically dened as the market value of a rm's assets divided by the
replacement value of the rm's assets. Then, when the assets are priced properly in the
16capital market, the Q ratio should be equal to one. The change of the Q ratio is an
direct measure of the change of the rm value in the capital market.
In this paper, we use the following equation for the theoretical Q ratio:
Q =
Book value of liability + Market value ofcommon stock
Book value of total asset
:
The market value of common equity can be found in the Datastream database. The
book value of liability and total assets are from the annual reports. However, several
companies do not have necessary market information such as market value and stock
prices during the period of 2000-2002 in the Datastream database due to mergers and
corporation reconstruction. Only twenty-eight companies and seventy-six rm-years are
therefore used.
Panel A in Table 4 shows the summary statistics of total asset (in millions of Cana-
dian dollars), market value of equity (in millions of Canadian dollars), and the corre-
sponding Q ratios. The average Q ratio is 1.56, which is similar to that of the U.S.13
The standard deviations of the Canadian oil and gas companies' total asset and market
value of equity are huge. Panels B and C of Table 4 illustrate the basic statistics of the
rms with hedging activities for oil and gas prices, respectively. On average, these rms
hedge about 23.0% of their next year oil production, which amounts to about 3.0% of
their oil reserves, and about 148.0% of their next year gas production, which represents
about 2.0% of their gas reserves. All the ratios are less than those of the U.S. oil and
gas companies. The Canadian oil and gas companies do not hedge as much as their U.S.
competitors do.14 The average Q ratio for oil hedging rms is 1.35, while that of gas
hedging rms is 1.31. Panel D of Table 4 shows the basic statistics of the rms without
any hedging activities. The large standard deviations of total asset and market value of
equity in non-hedging companies show that non-hedging occurs at both large and small
13See Jin and Jorion (2005).
14See Jin and Jorion (2005).




















































rms and it is not dependent on the rm size. The average Q ratio for non-hedging rms
is 2.00.
Figure 1 plots the book values of total asset of the oil and gas rms with or without
hedging. It shows that non-hedging companies vary substantially in size (both very small
and very large) while the hedging companies are concentrated in a particular range in
terms of the values of total asset. This may reect the fact that very large rms tend
to be integrated oil companies which can diversify their operations in both up- and
down-streams of the exploration, production, and distribution processes.
18Table 4: Basic Statistics of Adjusted Deltas
Panel A: All Firm-years
No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median
Total Asset (Cnd$M) 76 4019.22 5195.44 1135.98
MVE (Cnd$M) 76 3574.25 4857.15 838.46
Q ratio 76 1.56 0.93 1.34
Panel B: Firm-years with Hedging Activities for Oil
No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median
Total Asset (Cnd$M) 46 4356.03 4302.58 1857.33
MVE (Cnd$M) 46 3740.24 4083.39 1406.85
Dgp 46 0.23 0.22 0.18
Dgr 46 0.03 0.03 0.02
Q ratio 46 1.35 0.49 1.26
Panel C: Firm-years with Hedging Activities for Gas
No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median
Total Asset (Cnd$M) 41 4318.25 4323.21 2001.12
MVE (Cnd$M) 41 3180.61 3350.00 1263.33
Dgp 41 0.18 0.21 0.06
Dgr 41 0.02 0.03 0.01
Q ratio 41 1.31 0.40 1.24
Panel D: Firm-years without Hedging Activities
No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median
Total Asset (Cnd$M) 23 3670.47 7059.76 167.30
MVE (Cnd$M) 23 3663.59 6628.01 260.50
Q ratio 23 2.00 1.47 1.81
Note: Total Asset represents the book value of asset. MVE repre-
sents the market value of equity. Total asset and MVE are in million
Canadian dollars (Cdn$M). Dop and Dor denote the adjusted deltas
of oil production and reserves, respectively. Dgp and Dgr denote the
adjusted deltas of gas production and reserves, respectively. Panel
A shows the statistics for the all rm-years. The statistics for sub-
samples of rm-years with hedging activities for oil and gas are re-
ported, respectively, in Panels B and C. Panel D illustrates the statis-
tics of rm-years without any hedging activities.
194 Impact of Hedging on the Relationship between
Stock Returns and Oil and Gas Prices
In this section, we examine the impact of hedging on the relationship between stock
returns and oil and gas prices using both linear and nonlinear models. We rst study
the relationship between stock returns and oil and gas prices directly based on the
monthly data. Then we extend our models to study the roles of hedging and reserves in
determining stock returns.
As shown in Figure 2, monthly stock returns of hedging rms appear to have slightly
lower volatility than those of non-hedging rms during the period of 2001-2002. But it
is still unclear as what roles that hedging may play. Therefore, we need to study this in
depth using the multi-factor models.
4.1 Relationship between Oil and Gas Prices and Stock Re-
turns
To examine the relationship between stock returns and oil and gas price changes, we
rst adopt the following model of Jin and Jorion (2005):
Rit =  + mRmt + oRot + gRgt + "it (1)
where Rit is the stock return for Canadian oil and/or gas company i at time t; Rmt
denotes the market-index return or the S&P/TSX 60 index return at time t;15 Rot is
the percentage change in the price of NYMEX near futures contracts for oil (\oil price
change" hereafter) at time t; Rgt is the percentage change in the price of NYMEX near
15The S&P/TSX 60 index consists of 60 largest (measured by market capitalization) and most liquid
(heavily traded) stocks listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX). They are usually domestic or
multinational industry leaders in Canada.
20Figure 2: Monthly Stock Returns with or without Hedging
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21futures contracts for natural gas (\gas price change" hereafter) at time t; and "it is
the error term for company i at time t in this model. The advantage of this model is
that betas associated with oil and gas price changes may illustrate the role of hedging
indirectly. If these betas are close to zero, this indicates that stock returns are not
sensitive to these price changes.
The time dummy and rm dummies are also tested in the model but they are not
statistically signicant. Hence, we pool the cross-sectional and time series data to es-
timate this model. Furthermore, because of their resulting extreme Cook's distance in
the stock return estimates, some data points (Gastar Exploration in February 2002 and
Peyto Exploration and Development in October 2001) are excluded from the sample.16
Table 5 shows the estimation results for the pooled monthly data during the period
of 2000-2002. Panel A of Table 5 shows that stock returns have linear relationships
with oil and gas price changes. These relationships are mostly positive and statistically
signicant. On average, a 1% change in oil price leads to a 0.26% change in stock returns.
This Canadian result is similar to that found by Rajgopal (1999) and Jin and Jorion
(2005). But a 1% change in gas price only leads to a 0.10% change in stock returns,
which is much lower than that of Rajgopal (1999) (0.41%) or Jin and Jorion (2005)
(0.29%). The stock returns of these Canadian companies do not respond to gas price
changes as much as they do to oil price changes. However, we note that the value of the
beta associated with the market-index return is small and statistically insignicant. At
this point, we do not know if stock returns and the market-index return could relate to
each other nonlinearly.
To explore any nonlinear relationships, we extend our analysis by using the general-
ized additive model (GAM),17 which can be viewed as an extension of the generalized
16Cook's distance is a metric for measuring the inuential data points. A large Cook's distance for a
data point indicates that the data point is inuential in the linear regression [see Chambers and Hastie
(1992), p. 230].
17See Hestie (1990), Hestie and Tibshirani (1990), Wood (2000), Venables and Ripley (2002), and
Wood (2004).
22linear model (GLM).18 The advantage of GAM over GLM is that GAM is a more exible




The GAM takes the following functional form:
g[(x1;x2;:::;xp)] =  + s1(x1) +  + sp(xp); (2)
where (x1;x2;:::;xp) = E(Y jX1;X2;:::;Xp), g is the link function,  is a constant,
and s is a continuous and twice dierentiable function. When Y is a real valued variable
and the error is assumed to be Gaussian, and the link function g is the identity function,
the GAM is reduced to the additive model as follows
E(Y jX1;;Xp) =  + s1(x1) +  + sp(xp): (3)
The above structure regression can be deemed as the rst order analysis of variance
(ANOVA) decomposition of E(Y jX1;;Xp) = s(x1;:::;xp) in a p-dimensional real
space Rp.
The nonlinear functions sj(xj)(j = 1;:::;p) are estimated jointly by the backtting





















18See McCullagh and Nelder (1989).
23by iteratively tting nonlinear functions sj(xj)(j = 1;;p) using a one dimensional







The tuning parameter j can be either pre-specied or automatically searched in each
step by minimizing the generalized cross-validation (GCV) score. Sometimes we write
sj(xj) as s(xj;dj) where dj is the degree of smoothness. dj may be non-integer. A more
recent version of GAM tting implemented in the mgcv package in R by Wood (2000,
2004) selects the multiple smoothing parameters more eciently through minimization
of the GCV score. This package employs a Bayesian approach to estimate the variance
so that it makes the condence interval calculation for s(xj;dj)(j = 1;:::;p) easier.19
Figure 3 and Panel B of Table 5 show that the nonlinear eects of changes in oil and
gas prices on stock returns are very signicant. In GAM, the 2 test is performed to test
the nonlinearity of each s function. It turns out that all three explanatory variables have
nonlinear relationships with stock returns. The GAM ts the data better and R2-adj
reaches 0.194, a substantial increase from that of the linear model.
Figure 3 shows the estimated nonlinear eects of the explanatory variables on stock
returns. First, we note that s(Rmt;8:51) is quite at when Rmt > 0. But s(Rmt;8:51)
becomes negative at Rmt =  0:10 and becomes positive at Rmt =  0:05. In other
words, stock returns of oil and gas companies do not have a linear sensitivity to the
market-index return. Clearly, this nonlinear relationship could not be identied in the
linear model. Second, we nd that s(Rot;6:19) has a slightly positive slope. s(Rot;6:19)
becomes negative when Rot =  0:05 and becomes positive when Rot > 0:10. If the oil
price falls more than 5%, stock returns go down but do not fall as fast as the oil price
does. If the oil price rises more than 10%, stock returns rise but do not rise as fast
as the oil price does. This could result from some form of hedging. Third, we note
19See Wood (2000) for details.
24that s(Rgt;4:71) has a slight negative slope. s(Rgt;4:71) become sensitive to Rgt when
Rgt <  0:20 or > 0:20. It implies that stock returns rise when the gas price falls by
20%. However, stock returns fall when the gas price rises more than 20%. This is an
indirect evidence of some form of hedging of gas prices.
4.2 Impact of Hedging on Stock Returns
In this section, we extend the previous model to a more general setting in order to
examine explicitly whether oil and gas hedging can moderate the impact of oil and gas
price changes on stock returns. We use the following extended model for this purpose:
Rit =  + mRmt + [1 + 2Dopit + 3(ORit=MV Eit)]Rot (5)
+[4 + 5Dgpit + 6(GRit=MV Eit)]Rgt + it
where Dopit (Dgpit) is the adjusted delta of oil (gas) production for rm i at time t;
ORit (GRit) is the oil (gas) reserves of rm i at time t; and MV Eit is the market value
of equity for rm i at time t. 's are parameters and "it is the error term for rm i
at time t. This extended model maintains the key explanatory variables and adds the
variables for oil/gas hedging and oil/gas reserves.
The above model is used in the nance literature for the following hypotheses. The
rst hypothesis is that hedging by a rm can reduce the impact of oil and gas prices
on its stock return; or 2 and 5 are expected to be negative. The second hypothesis
is that a rm owning more oil and/or gas reserves has greater risk exposure to changes
in oil and gas prices; or 3 and 6 should be positive. However, as noted that these
linear relationships can be quite restricted if the partial responses to some explanatory
variables are nonlinear. In this research, we allow these relationships to be nonlinear.
25Table 5: Statistical Analysis of Stock Price Exposure
Panel A: Linear Three-factor Model for Stock Returns (Rit)
Explanatory Variables Coecient Std. dev. t-ratio p-value
Intercept 0.020 0.004 5.044 0.000
Rmt 0.017 0.061 0.284 0.777
Rot 0.263 0.050 5.318 0.000
Rgt 0.095 0.025 3.810 0.000
No. of obs. 881
R2-adj 0.055
Panel B: Nonlinear Three-factor Model for Stock Returns (Rit)
Terms in GAM Coecient Std. dev. t-ratio p-value
2 test for nonlinearity
Intercept 0.024 0.003 6.967 0.000
s(Rmt;8:51) | | 62.862 0.000
s(Rot;6:19) | | 95.146 0.000
s(Rgt;4:71) | | 20.009 0.019
No. of obs. 881
R2-adj 0.194
Note: This table illustrates the estimation results of the linear coecients and
nonlinear functions in three-factor model. Panel A represents the estimation
results of the linear model:
Rit =  + mRmt + oRot + gRgt + "it:
Panel B shows the estimation of the generalized additive model.
Rit =  + s(Rmt) + s(Rot) + s(Rgt) + "it:
Here Rit, Rmt, Rot, and Rgt denote the stock return of company i at time t , the
market-index return at time t, the percentage change in the NYMEX crude
oil futures price at time t , and the percentage change in the NYMEX gas
future price at time t, respectively. "it is the error term. The sample includes
the pooled monthly data during the period of 2000-2002. s(x;d) denotes the
estimated nonlinear function of variable x with d degrees of smoothness.
26Figure 3: Nonlinear Variables in The Three-factor Model





































































Note: This gure shows the estimated nonlinear curves of the variables. Rmt
(for Rmt), Rot (for Rot), and Rgt (for Rgt) denote the market-index return,
the oil price change and the gas price change, respectively. s(x;d) denotes the
nonlinear function of the variable x with d degrees of smoothness. Solid lines
represent estimated nonlinear relationships. Broken lines show 95% condence
interval of nonlinear variables. Dotted lines are reference lines, which have
angles of 0 and 90 respectively. The "rug" on the horizontal axis indicates the
data density.
27Hence we t both linear and nonlinear models surrounding the specication of equa-
tion (3). After an intensive model search, we identify the linear model shown in Panel
A of Table 6. In this linear model, the signicant explanatory variables are the oil price
change, the gas price change, the interaction term between the oil price change and oil
reserves, and the interaction term between the market-index return and the gas price
change. The estimation results for the Canadian oil and gas companies are similar to
those in Rajgopal (1999) and Jin and Jorion (2005) in the sense that they are consistent
with the hypotheses for negative 2 and 5 and positive 3 and 6. But these parameter
estimates are not all statistically signicant.20 Only the parameter estimate associated
with the oil reserves is statistically signicant but quantitatively small. Hence the ev-
idence for the above hypotheses is weak at the best. Is it likely that the linear model
limits the revelation of potential underlying nonlinear relationships?
To answer this question, we once again implement the more exible GAM approach.
Panel B of Table 6 shows that in addition to the signicant explanatory variables in
the linear model the market-index return becomes a statistically signicant factor in the
nonlinear model. In order to evaluate if the nonlinear model is indeed superior to its
linear counterpart, the null hypothesis under which the linear model is true is tested by
the F-test based on the dierence in deviances between the linear and nonlinear models
with the dispersion parameter adjustment. The resultant p-value is close to zero. Hence
we can conclude that the nonlinear model provides a better t to this data. Other
model selection criteria, such as the information criterion (AIC) and the goodness of t
(R2-adj) also conrm this conclusion.
The two previously discussed hypotheses, which boil down to two sets of linear re-
striction hypotheses in the linear model, can no longer be tested directly any more in
the nonlinear setting. Instead, the graphs for the discovered nonlinear functions from
the nonlinear model are more informative and can be used to evaluate the two rela-
20The presented model excludes the insignicant explanatory variables except Rmt.
28tionships. Panel B of Table 6 and Figure 4 show not only what explanatory variables
are statistically signicant but also how these variables aect stock returns in nonlinear
ways. The rst important nding is that the hedging activities on oil and gas in the
Canadian companies appear to play little roles as both DopitRot and DgpitRgt fail to be
statistically signicant and hence are excluded from the chosen models. Therefore, the
statement that 2 and 5 are positive in the linear model cannot be supported by the
Canadian data.
Figure 4 shows the estimated curves and their 95% condence intervals for sta-
tistically signicant nonlinear functions between stock returns and some explanatory
variables. Specically, Figure 4 demonstrates that the market-index return Rmt (for
Rmt) has a nonlinear relationship with stock return s(Rmt, 8.08) [for s(Rmt;8:08)]. This
nonlinear relationship corresponds to the conventional beta for the market-index return
in the linear model. When the market-index return moves up and down by about 5%,
stock returns rise. However, when the market-index return moves, up or down, beyond
the 5 % stock returns fall.
Figure 4 shows that when the oil price Rot [for Rot] falls by 0-5%, stock returns
s(Rot,6.59) [for s(Rot;6:59)] fall. when the oil price Rot [for Rot] rises by more than 10%,
stock returns s(Rot,6.59) [for s(Rot;6:59)] rise. There is a positive relationship between
the two but the slope of the curve is not as steep. On the other hand, the relationship
between the gas price Rgt [for Rgt] and stock returns s(Rgt,2.18) [for s(Rgt;2:18)] is fairly
at with the 95% condence intervals covering zero although the slope of the curve is
slightly positive (negative) when Rgt < 0 (Rgt > 0). Both nonlinear relationships show
some non-responsiveness of stock returns to oil/gas price movements, in particular on
the downside. This is consistent with the observation obtained from the previous model
that there is an indirect evidence that some form of hedging is taking place.
Corresponding to the hypothesis that oil and gas reserves should be positively re-
lated to stock returns (positive 3 and 3,) in the linear model, Figure 4 shows that
29the relationship between oil reserves (OR/MVE)Rot [for (ORit=MV Eit)Rot] and stock
returns s((OR/MVE)Rot,7.79) [for s((ORit=MV Eit)Rot;7:79)] is not linear. Instead,
it is nonlinear. Further, the scale of inuence by (OR/MVE)Rot on the stock return
s((OR/MVE)Rot,7.79) is much larger in comparison with that of other factors. Stock
returns rise when oil reserves marked to the market are higher. But when oil reserves
marketed to the market are lower, stock returns fall. That is, oil and gas reserves are
more likely to have a positive (negative) impact on stock returns when the oil and gas
prices are increasing (decreasing).
Another important nding from Figure 4 is that the interaction term, Rmt.Rgt (for
RmtRgt), and their impact on stock returns, s(Rmt.Rgt,2.54) [for s(Rmt:Rgt;2:54)], have
a convex relationship. When this interaction term is in the range of 0.00%-0.02%, stock
returns fall. However, beyond this range stock returns rise. There are several reasons
for this phenomenon. First, this reects the fact that when the gas price change and the
market-index return move in the opposite direction, which leads to the negativity of the
interaction term, stock returns rise. In this case, stock returns still benet either from
the rise of the stock market even if the gas price drops or from the gas price hike even
if the stock market is down. Second, When the gas price change and the market-index
return rise at the same time, stock returns rise as they will benet from both the rise of
the stock market as well as the gas price hike. Third, if both the stock market and gas
price fall at the same time, the interaction term becomes positive. In this case, stock
returns can rise if other factors such as hedging, cost cutting, and nding new reserves
play signicant roles. We will explore the roles of other factors in the next section when
we evaluate rm value which has a direct link to stock returns.
30Table 6: Eect of Hedging and Oil and Gas Prices on Stock Returns
Panel A: Linear Oil and Gas Beta Model (Rit)
Explanatory Variables Coecient Std. dev. t-ratio p-value
Intercept 0.016 0.004 3.957 0.000
Rmt 0.001 0.061 0.013 0.990
Rot 0.175 0.056 3.126 0.002
Rgt 0.134 0.028 4.669 0.000
(ORit=MV Eit)Rot 0.008 0.004 2.320 0.021
Rmt  Rgt 0.949 0.357 2.660 0.008
No. of obs. 881
R2-adj 0.066
Panel B: Nonlinear Oil and Gas Beta Model (Rit)
Explanatory Variables Coecient Std. dev. t-ratio p-value
2 test for nonlinearity
Intercept 0.024 0.003 7.090 0.000
s(Rmt;8:08) | | 68.330 0.000
s(Rot;6:59) | | 63.474 0.000
s(Rgt;2:18) | | 19.593 0.022
s(ORit=MV Eit)Rot;7:79) | | 37.026 0.000
s(Rmt  Rgt;2:54) | | 26.153 0.002
No. of obs. 881
R2-adj 0.222
Note: The table shows the pooled cross-section time-series regressions of stock
returns on the market and oil (gas) price changes, with coecients adjusted
for the eect of hedging and reserves, for the period of 2000-2002. In Panel A,
the joint linear model is given by:
Rit =  + mRmt + [1 + 2Dopit + 3(ORit=MV Eit)]Rot
+[4 + 5Dgpit + 6(GRit=MV Eit)]Rgt + it
Rit, Rmt, Rot, and Rgt denote the stock return of company i at time t , the
market-index return at time t, the percentage change in the NYMEX crude oil
futures price at time t , and the percentage change in the NYMEX gas future
price at time t, respectively. Dopit (Dgpit) is the adjusted deltas of oil (gas)
production of company i at time t. ORit (GRit) is the value of oil (gas) reserves
of company i at time t. MV Eit is the market value of equity of company i at
time t. "it is the error term. Panel B shows GAM results. Df denotes degrees
of freedom. s(x;d) denotes the nonlinear function of the variable x with d
degrees of smoothness. The sample includes the pooled monthly data during
the period of 2000-2002.



































































































































































Note: This gure shows curves of the signicant nonlinear relationships. Rmt
(for Rmt), Rgt (for Rgt), and Rot (for Rot) denote the market-index return,
the gas price change and the oil price change, respectively. (OR/MVE)Rot
(for (ORit=MV Eit)Rot) denotes the sensitivities to oil reserves. Rmt.Rgt (for
RmtRgt) is the interaction term between the market-index return and the gas
price change. s(x;d) denotes the nonlinear function of the variable x with d
degree freedom. Solid lines represent the estimated nonlinear relationships.
Broken lines give the 95% condence intervals of the estimated nonlinear re-
lationships. Dotted lines are reference lines, which have angles of 0 and 90
respectively. The "rug" on the horizontal axis indicates the data density.
325 Hedging and Firm Value
5.1 Univariate Analysis
Whether rms that hedge have a higher rm value or a higher Q ratio than those that
do not is also an important question in evaluating the roles of hedging. Therefore, we
compare the values of hedging rms with those of non-hedging rms. Table 7 reports the
univariate analysis of dierences in the Q ratio, book value of total asset, and market
value of equity between oil/gas hedging and non-hedging rms. Panel A and B of Table
7 show the basic statistics for the oil hedging rms with respect to non-oil hedging and
non-hedging rms, respectively. The similar analysis is reported for the gas hedging
rms with respect to non-gas hedging and non-hedging rms, respectively in Panel C
and D. Table 7 shows that the dierences between hedging and non-hedging rms are
primarily in the Q ratio and that the rms with oil and gas hedging tend to have lower
Q ratios.
5.2 Multivariate Analysis
The Q ratio is likely to be determined by many dierent factors and hence is better
analyzed by separating the hedging dummy variables from oil and gas price changes and
adding oil and gas deltas and other control variables. In this research, a more general
regression model is employed:
lnQit =  + 1(Oil Heding Dummy)it + 2(Gas Hedging dummy)it (6)
+3Dopit + 4Dorit + 5Dgpit + 6Dgrit + (Control V ariables)it + "it;
where subscript i is for rm i and subscript t is for time t.
33Table 7: Comparison of Firm Values between Hedging and Non-hedging Firms
Panel A: Oil Hedging and Non-oil Hedging Firms
Variables Hedging Non-hedging Dierence t-test (mean) p-value
(46 obs.) (30 obs.) Z-test (median)
Q(mean) 1.35 1.87 -0.52 -2.09 0.04
Q(median) 1.27 1.55 -0.28 -2.27 0.02
BV(mean) 4356.03 3502.78 853.25 0.64 0.52
BV(median) 1857.33 433.20 1424.13 2.66 0.01
MVE(mean) 3740.24 3319.73 420.51 0.34 0.74
MVE(median) 1406.85 488.68 918.17 2.01 0.04
Panel B: Oil Hedging and Non-hedging Firms
Variables Hedging Non-hedging Dierence t-test (mean) p-value
(46 obs.) (23 obs.) Z-test (median)
Q(mean) 1.35 2.00 -0.65 -2.05 0.05
Q(median) 1.27 1.81 -0.55 -1.97 0.05
BV(mean) 4356.03 3670.47 685.56 0.43 0.67
BV(median) 1857.33 167.30 1690.03 2.83 0.00
MVE(mean) 3740.24 3663.59 76.65 0.05 0.96
MVE(median) 1406.85 260.50 1146.35 2.09 0.04
Panel C: Gas Hedging and Non-gas Hedging Firms
Variables Hedging Non-hedging Dierence t-test (mean) p-value
(41 obs.) (35 obs.) Z-test (median)
Q(mean) 1.31 1.85 -0.54 -2.47 0.02
Q(median) 1.24 1.75 -0.51 -2.63 0.01
BV(mean) 4318.25 3668.93 649.33 0.53 0.60
BV(median) 2001.12 540.60 1460.52 2.82 0.00
MVE(mean) 3180.61 4035.37 -854.76 -0.73 0.47
MVE(median) 1263.33 439.05 824.28 1.74 0.08
Panel D: Gas Hedging and Non-hedging Firms
Variables Hedging Non-hedging Dierence t-test (mean) p-value
(41 obs.) (23 obs.) Z-test (median)
Q(mean) 1.31 2.00 -0.69 -2.21 0.04
Q(median) 1.24 1.81 -0.57 -2.14 0.03
BV(mean) 4318.25 3670.47 647.79 0.40 0.69
BV(median) 2001.12 167.30 1833.82 3.04 0.00
MVE(mean) 3180.61 3663.59 -482.98 -0.33 0.75
MVE(median) 1263.33 260.50 1002.83 2.38 0.02
Note: This compares means and medians of Q ratios (Q), book values (BV) of total asset and market values of equity
(MVE) between hedging and non-hedging companies. Panels A and B show the comparison between oil hedging companies
and non-oil hedging and non-hedging companies respectively. Similarly, Panels C and D show the comparisons between gas
hedging companies and non-gas hedging and non-hedging companies respectively. A t-test assuming unequal variances is
used for comparing means. Wilcoxon ranksum Z-test is used for comparing medians. Two-side p-values are reported. Both
BV and MVE are in million Canadian dollar (Cdn$M).
34As in Allayannias and Weston (2001) and Jin and Jorion (2005), the control vari-
ables are return on asset, investment growth, access to nancial markets, leverage, and
production cost. Return on asset (Roa) is measured by the ratio of net income to book
value of total asset. It is expected to have a positive association with the Q ratio because
highly protable rms tend to have a high Q ratio. Investment growth is measured by the
ratio of capital expenditure to book value of total asset. It is expected to have a positive
coecient because rm value depends more on future investment. Access to nancial
market is measured by a dividend dummy variable that equals 1 if the company has
paid a dividend in the current year, 0 otherwise. There are two dierent views on the
information role of dividend payment. Some suggest that dividend-paying rms are less
nancially constrained and may invest in less optimal projects. Hence, they have lower
Q ratios [see Allayannis and Weston (2001)]. Others argue that dividend-paying rms
typically have good management and hence higher Q ratios [see Jin and Jorion (2005)].
Leverage is measured by the ratio of book value of long-term debt to market value of
common equity. It is expected to be negatively related to the Q ratio. Production cost
refers the cost of extracting oil and gas as reported in annual reports. This variable is
expected to be negatively related with the Q ratio [see Jin and Jorion (2005)]. Although
the book value of total asset can be a reasonable proxy for rm size, we do exclude this
variable as a control variable in the model to avoid the endogenous problem because the
Q ratio is also directly linked to the book value.
Table 8 illustrates the regression results for both linear and nonlinear models after
an intensive model search. The resulting linear model is nested in the selected nonlinear
model. Based on the AIC, R2 and R2-adj, the nonlinear model has a better t for
the data. The tests based on the dierence in deviance and the F-tests also support
the conclusion that the nonlinear model, which is the mixture of linear and nonlinear
relationships, is superior to the linear model.
35Table 8 shows that both selected linear and nonlinear models do not include the fol-
lowing explanatory variables: investment growth, assess to nancial market, production
cost, delta values relative to oil production and reserves, and oil and gas hedging dummy
variables. These variables, if included in the model, are not statistically signicant.
Table 8 shows that in both selected linear and nonlinear models only return on asset,
leverage, adjusted delta of gas production, and adjusted delta of gas reserves are statisti-
cally signicant. R2-adj of the nonlinear model is 0.359, higher than that of the linear
model (0.242). The nonlinear model contains both linear and nonlinear relationships.
Firm value has a positive linear relationship with return on asset and adjusted delta of
gas reserves, a negative linear relationship with adjusted delta of gas production, and a
nonlinear relationship with leverage.
Because the generalized additive model is tted on the logarithm of the Q ratio,
these partial eects of these explanatory variables may be interpreted as multiplicative
explanatory variables for the Q ratio itself. Each penal in Figure 6 shows the partial
eect of the explanatory variable on lnQ while holding other explanatory variables xed.
When Roa is set to 1%, the Q-ratio is e(2:372)(0:01) = 1:024. In other words, 1% increase in
Roa leads to an increase of 0.024 in the Q ratio. Clearly the higher the return on asset,
the higher the Q ratio. When Dgp is set to 1%, the Q-ratio is e( 1:731)(0:01) = 0:983. That
is, 1% increase in Dgp leads to a decrease of 0.017 the Q ratio. When Dgr is set to 1%
the Q ratio is e(10:063)(0:01) = 1:106. That is, 1% increase in Dgr leads to an increase of
0.106 in the Q ratio. The relationship between two gas hedging variables demonstrates
the need for some delicate balance between gas hedging relative to production and gas
hedging relative to reserves in order to obtain the highest Q-ratio. The discovered
relationships imply that within a feasible choice set, a lower ratio of Dgp to Dgr leads
to a higher Q ratio. This means that higher gas reserves relative to gas production for
a given level of hedging activities lead to a higher Q ratio. Finally, leverage appears to
have a nonlinear relationship with lnQ. When leverge takes values between 0%{15%,
the Q ratio is greater than 1. However, when leverage rises by more than 15%, the
36Q ratio falls below 1. This indicates that leverage is another important factor that
determines rm value.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this research, we aim to uncover the relationships between hedging activities and rm
value in large Canadian oil and gas companies by examining the impact of oil and gas
hedging for the period of 2000-2002. This is perhaps the rst systematic study of this
kind with the Canadian oil and gas data.
We extend the methodology in the existing studies by employing nonlinear semi-
parametric additive models to accommodate nonlinear payos of various hedging strate-
gies. This approach is useful for identifying nonlinear roles of hedging that would other-
wise not be possible within a linear framework. Indeed, the data analysis in this paper
indicates that nonlinear semi-parametric additive models are superior to their linear
parametric counterparts.
By examining the impact of hedging on relationships between stock returns and oil/
gas price changes, we nd that stock returns indeed respond to these price changes in
nonlinear ways and stock returns do not fall as oil and gas prices are falling. We also
nd that gas hedging appears to be more eective than oil hedging is. These ndings
are not observable in the linear model.
Then we further incorporate into the model direct measures of oil and gas hedging
and the direct measures of oil and gas reserves. Once again, the direct measures of oil
and gas hedging are not as important as the oil and gas reserves are in inuencing stock
returns. The evidence shows that Canadian oil and gas rms are able to have some
down side protection against unfavorable changes in oil and gas prices. In addition, oil
37Table 8: Hedging and Firm Value
Linear Model
Explanatory Coecient Std. dev. t-ratio p-value
Variable
Intercept 0.437 0.085 5.173 0.000
Dgp -1.857 0.704 -2.640 0.001
Dgr 10.003 3.735 2.679 0.009
Roa 1.845 0.578 3.194 0.002
Leverage -0.685 0.182 -3.763 0.000
No. of Obs. 76
R2-adj 0.242
Nonlinear Model
Explanatory Coecient Std. dev. t-ratio p-value
Variable 2 test
for nonlinearity
Intercept 0.194 0.063 3.070 0.003
Dgp -1.731 0.660 -2.623 0.011
Dgr 10.063 3.492 2.882 0.005
Roa 2.372 0.563 4.213 0.000
s(Leverage;6:363) | | 37.671 0.000
No. of Obs. 76
R2-adj 0.359
Note: This table shows the selected linear and nonlinear regression mod-
els for analyzing the impact of hedging on rm value. These models are
variants of the following specication:
lnQit =  + 1(Oil Heding Dummy)it + 2(Gas Hedging dummy)it
+3Dopit+4Dorit+5Dgpit+6Dgrit+(Control V ariables)it+"it;
This sample includes twenty-eight rms and seventy-six rm-years from
2000 to 2002. Dgp is the delta value relative to gas production. Dgr is
the delta value relative to gas reserves. Roa is the ratio of net income
over book value of total asset. Leverage is measured by the book value
of long-term debt to market value of common equity. s(Leverage;6:363)
denotes the nonlinear function of the variable leverage with 6.363 degrees
of smoothness. Df denotes degrees of freedom.
38Figure 5: Linear and Nonlinear Relationships for Firm Value




































































Note: This gure shows the estimated linear and nonlinear relationships in
solid lines for lnQ. Roa is the ratio of net income to book value of total asset.
The partial impact of Roa on lnQ [s(Roa;1)] is linear. Leverage is measured
by the ratio of book value of long-term debt to market value and has a nonlinear
relationship with lnQ [s(Leverage;3:36)]. The higher the leverage is, the lower
the rm value is. Dgp denotes the delta value relative to gas production and it
has a negative linear relationship with lnQ [s(Dgp;1)]. Dgr denotes the delta
value relative to gas reserves and it has a positive linear relationship with lnQ
[s(Dgr;1)]. Broken lines give the 95% condence intervals of the estimated
nonlinear relationships. Dotted lines are reference lines, which have angles of
0 and 90 respectively. The "rug" on the horizontal axis indicates the data
density.
39reserves are more likely to have a positive (negative) impact on stock returns when oil
prices are increasing (decreasing).
Finally, we examine the impact of hedging on rm value measured by Tobin's Q ratio
using both linear and nonlinear models. We nd that protability (return on asset) has
a positive impact on rm value and that borrowing has a negative impact on rm value.
In addition, we nd that hedging activities relative to gas production have a signicant
negative impact on rm value at the margin while hedging activities relative to gas
reserves have a signicant positive impact on rm value. This may indicate the need
for some delicate balance between gas hedging relative to production and gas hedging
relative to reserves in order to obtain the highest Q-ratio. The discovered relationships
imply that higher gas reserves relative to gas production for a given level of gas hedging
activities lead to a higher Q ratio.
There are several other issues left for future studies. First, the hedging informa-
tion from annual reports may be incomplete as some companies may under-report their
hedging activities in their annual reports. If Canada has a new regulation like FRR 48
in the U.S. more information will be available. Second, most of Canadian oil and gas
companies export oil and gas directly to the U.S. and many of them may rely on hedging
more on foreign-exchange-rate exposure rather than oil-and-gas-price exposure. These
interesting issues are left for future research.
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44Appendix 1 Hedging Information in 2002 Annual Report of Acclaim En-
ergy Trust
A. Information in Management's Discussion & Analysis
COMMODITY MARKETING AND PRICE RISK MANAGEMENT
Upon closing the acquisition of Elk Point, Acclaim's natural gas weighting increased
to 53 percent of production, while conventional oil and NGLs and heavy oil comprise 39
percent and 8 percent respectively.

WTI averaged US$26.11 per bbl in 2002, a slight increase to the average of US$25.97
per bbl in 2001. Acclaim's price is also inuenced by the Canadian$/US$ exchange rate
as well as the degree of gravity of the oil and hedging activity. The majority of Acclaim's
production is classied as light oil which trades at a premium relative to medium and
heavy oil. Early in 2003, the benchmark WTI has been very strong averaging US$34.86
per bbl in the rst quarter due primarily to uncertainties associated with the conict in
the Middle East.

As of March 2003, Acclaim had hedging contracts in place originating from Acclaim,
Ketch Energy, Elk Point and various predecessor companies. Since the combination of
Acclaim with Ketch Energy, the Trust has layered on additional marketing contracts
and will continue to do so on an ongoing basis, in order to maintain the stability of
long-term cash distributions.
B. Information in Notes of Consolidated Financial Statement
15. HEDGING AND FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
45The Trust's nancial instruments recognized on the consolidated balance sheets in-
clude accounts receivable, accounts payable and accrued liabilities, bank debt and hedg-
ing and capital lease obligations. The fair values of nancial instruments other than
bank debt approximates their carrying amounts due to the short-term nature of these
instruments. The carrying value of bank debt approximates its fair value due to oating
interest terms; the fair value of the obligation under capital lease approximates carrying
value due to current rates for comparable terms of the lease obligation. The fair value
of the interest rate swaps associated with bank debt is disclosed in Note 6.
The Trust is exposed to the commodity price uctuations of crude oil and natural
gas and to uctuations of the Canada - US dollar exchange rate. The Trust manages this
risk by entering into various on and o balance sheet derivative nancial instruments. A
portion of the Trust's exposure to these uctuations is hedged through the use of swaps
and forward contracts. The Trust's exposure to interest rate uctuations is disclosed
in Note 6. The Trust is exposed to credit risk due to the potential non-performance of
counter parties to the above nancial instruments. The Trust mitigates this risk by deal-
ing only with larger, well-established commodity marketing companies and with major
national chartered banks. As a result of commodity hedging transactions, petroleum
and natural gas sales for 2002 increased by $0.5 million (2001 - $5.5 million).
December 31, 2002 outstanding contracts (see the following table)
46Crude Oil: Outstanding Contracts
Financial Instrument Daily Volume Floor/Ceiling Term
(bbls)
Three way collar 1,000 US$20.00{25.00{29.00 Jan.1, 2003{Jul.31, 2003
Three way collar 1,000 US$22.00{24.00{28.60 Jan.1, 2003{Dec.31, 2003
Collar 500 US$22.00{29.00 Jan.1, 2003{Dec.31, 2003
Collar 500 US$22.00{29.50 Jan.1, 2003{Dec.31, 2003
Collar 500 US$24.00{29.00 Jan.1, 2003{Jun.30, 2003
Collar 500 US$24.00{29.07 Jan.1, 2003{Jun.30, 2003
47Appendix 2 Hedging Instruments
In hedging activities, xed-price contracts, forwards, received-xed swaps and options
(including collars and three-way options) are the main instruments used by Canadian
oil and gas companies.
A xed-price contract obliges the supplier to deliver a dened commodity to a con-
sumer at a predetermined price. Many such contracts include signicant penalties for
non-delivery. A xed-price contract shifts most or all risks from the buyer to the supplier,
and simultaneously shifts the management burden from the buyer to the supplier.
Forward or a forward contract is an over-the-counter contractual obligation to buy
or sell a nancial instrument/a commodity at an agreed price and to make a payment
or a delivery at a pre-set future time between the two counterparties. Forward contracts
generally are arranged to have zero mark-to-market value at inception, although they
may be o-market. Examples include forward foreign exchange contracts in which one
party is obligated to buy foreign exchange from another party at a xed rate for delivery
on a pre-set date. O-market forward contracts are often used in structured combina-
tions, with the value on a forward contract osetting the value of another instrument or
other instruments.
Received-xed commodity swaps are the swaps in which exchanged ows are depen-
dent on the prices of a commodity (or an underlying commodity index). The commodity
producer who wishes to avoid the commodity price uctuation can engage in this kind
of swaps by paying a fee to a nancial institution that is willing to pay the producer the
xed payments for the commodity and accept the commodity price uctuation.
A collar, or a zero cost collar option, is a positive-carry collar that secures a return
through the purchase of a oor and sale of a cap. An example of a zero cost option collar
for selling commodity is the purchase of a put option and the sale of a call option with a
higher strike price. The sale of the call will cap the return if the price of the underlying
48commodity rises, but the premium collected from the sale of the call will oset the cost
of the purchased put.
The three-way options is an option strategy created by adding to a collar, another
long put (call) option position whose strike price is lower (higher) than that of put (call)
option in the collar to benet from falling (rising) prices. In other words, the motive of
those hedging activities for each oil and gas companies is to sell oil and gas with ideal
prices.
49